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INTRODUCTION 
Learning the law is less like studying mathematics, and more like 
studying the web of a spider. The student of mathematics can learn 
the most basic operation, and proceed step by step to advanced 
operations that depend only on the previous ones. The student of 
law finds that one legal idea does not lead to another so much as that 
every idea connects to every other idea, and even fundamental prin-
ciples require knowledge of other principles. In a sense, one needs to 
know everything in order to understand anything. 
Yet not everything can be explained at the same time. This book 
attempts to organize topics in a logical order, but the reader is 
unlikely fully to understand even the first topic unless the reader 
also understands, (at least something about) several of the top-
ics that follow it. One solution to this problem is to suggest that 
the reader read this book more than once. Even the author can-
not advise that step. Another solution is to include cross-references 
(which are the way a book presents hyperlinks). But no one likes 
skipping back and forth in a book, and probably no one does it 
as often as one should. Some cross-references seem necessary, but 
they are kept to a minimum. Our best solution is to summarize a 
few basic ideas here at the outset. Some of these ideas are discussed 
in greater detail in their logical place in the organization of the 
1 
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book. If a better solution to this problem exists, the author would 
be grateful to learn about it. 
THE MEANING OF "THE LAW" 
Most Americans believe that legislatures make the law and that courts 
apply the law to individual cases. As any lawyer well knows, this belief 
is more false than true. It is somewhat true because legislatures do 
enact statutes, which the courts interpret and apply. But the belief is 
false because most law is actually made by the courts and by adminis-
trative agencies of the National Labor Relations Board. 
Courts make law in two ways. In the first way, which was more 
prevalent in the past, judges simply announced the law; we might say 
(though the judges never admitted it) that they invented the law. Leg-
islatures had passed only a few statutes, and the judges used customs 
in the community or applied their own ideas of right and wrong to 
decide cases; those decisions then became precedents that judges fol-
lowed in later cases. Such lawmaking is known as the common law. 
The common law continues to affect our lives today, though less pow-
erfully than in the past. 
In the second way that courts make law, the starting point is a stat-
ute passed by a legislature. If the case of A v. B falls squarely within 
the words of the statute, we may say that the legislature has made the 
law that governs that case. But what if the case of C v. D is just slightly 
outside the words of the statute? In this event, the judge must decide 
whether or not the statute applies to the case. In making this deci-
sion, the judge is making law for the parties to the case. Because of 
the doctrine of precedent, this new law will also control future cases 
that are similar to C v. D. Then the case of E v. F comes along, and it is 
slightly different from C v. D; once again the judge will make new law 
in deciding this case. And then the case of G v. H comes up, and so on. 
If a legislature is dissatisfied with a court's interpretation of a stat-
ute, the legislature has the power to amend the statute in order to 
override the court's interpretation; however, this power is not exer-
cised often. As a result, most law is made by court decisions. 
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EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: THE LEGAL DEFAULT 
For more than a century, American law has conceived of the basic rela-
tionship of employer to employee as a contract at will, which means 
that either party is free to enter or exit the employment relationship at 
any time and for any reason. Whenever the employer desires, she may 
hire or fire the worker; whenever the worker desires, she may accept a 
job or quit it: and neither need say why. 
One consequence of employment at will is that the term "perma-
nent" as in a "permanent job," is misleading. In most aspects of life, 
"permanent" means lasting forever, or at least a long time. In labor 
relations, however, "permanent" says little about how long some-
thing will last. Instead, "permanent" means not temporary, hut having 
no specific termination date. A permanent job today could be abol-
ished next week; a permanent employee today could quit or be laid 
off tomorrow. Another definition of "permanent" might be as of this 
moment, there is no plan to change. 
Employment at will is the legal default position in every state. Under 
employment at will, the employer and each individual employee 
negotiate _the employee's wages and working conditions. We will call 
such negotiations individual bargaining. In individual bargaining, the 
parties may agree on any terms they please. Take wages as an exam-
ple. An employer might agree to pay, and an employee might agree 
to accept, compensation of a dollar a day or a million dollars a day. 
Two employees might be doing identical work, yet one might be paid 
more than the other because each struck a different bargain with the 
employer. 
Like other defaults, employment at will can be changed. Individual 
bargaining can change employment at will. For example, the parties 
may agree that the job will last one year. If, without good cause, the 
employer fires the employee, or the employee quits the job, before 
the year is over, the action is a breach of contract, and a lawsuit may 
result. Statutes can also change employment at will, and many have 
done so. For example, one federal statute prohibits an employer 
from paying less than a minimum wage, and other statutes prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability. But these 
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changes to Employment at will are minor compared to the changes 
made by labor law. 
THE MEANING OF "LABOR LAW" 
The term "labor law" does not mean what it seems to. It seems to 
mean all of the law that applies to workers and employers. In fact, 
"labor law" refers to only a par t of this law, namely, the law that applies 
to unions and private employers. The reason for the confusion is that, 
when the term "labor law" came into use, the major laws that existed 
regarding workers applied to unions and private employers. In the 
last seventy-five years, the law has grown to include topics such as 
min imum wages, health and safety on the job, unemployment insur-
ance, pension plans, race and sex discrimination, and so forth. A new 
term, "employment law," has been coined for these laws. But "labor 
law" still means the law of unions and private employers. (Similarly, 
the term "labor relations" refers to dealings between employers and 
unions.) 
Today most labor law is federal law. It comprises several statutes 
enacted by Congress and interpretations of those statutes by the 
Labor Board and the courts. We will use the term "Labor Act" to refer 
to these statutes.* 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE LABOR CONTRACT 
Labor law provides that if the majority of workers want to be rep-
resented by a labor union, collective bargaining replaces individual 
bargaining. "Collective bargaining" means that wages and working 
conditions are established by negotiation between the employer, on the 
one side, and the union, as the representative of the workers, on the other 
side. When negotiation is successful, it results in a collective bargaining 
* A brief history of these statutes appears at the beginning of chapter 2. 
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agreement or labor contract. A collective bargaining agreement is usu-
ally written, but the written document is only part of the agreement. 
The agreement also includes established practices in the shop, spo-
ken and unspoken understandings between the parties, and, to some 
extent, customs of the industry. (In contrast, the written document is 
the entire agreement between parties to a commercial contract.) 
Collective bargaining refers both to the negotiation of labor 
contracts and to the administration of contracts. Thus, collective 
bargaining includes the settlement of disputes that arise while a con-
tract is in effect. For example, suppose a contract is in force and the 
employer changes a work rule. The union believes the contract pro-
hibits the change. Negotiations toward settling the dispute are part of 
collective bargaining. If the parties cannot resolve their differences, 
the dispute might be submitted to arbitration. Arbitration is also part 
of collective bargaining. 
ARBITRATION 
"Arbitration" is the use of a neutral party to settle a dispute. Most labor 
contracts contain grievance and arbitration procedures. In the typ-
ical case, a union raises a grievance or complaint, alleging that the 
employer has violated the collective bargaining agreement. The griev-
ance goes through several steps. If it is not resolved, the parties choose 
an impartial person who is knowledgeable about their industry. This 
person (the arbitrator) holds a hearing in which the parties present 
their evidence and arguments, and the arbitrator decides whether the 
grievance is justified. The parties have agreed to obey the decision of 
the arbitrator. If the loser refuses to obey, the decision can be enforced 
in court, 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Courts are the primary institution for enforcing most civil (as dis-
tinguished from criminal) law. If A and B enter into a contract, and 
A performs but B does not, A can go to court in order to force B to 
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abide by the contract or pay damages. In contrast, the pr imary insti-
tution for enforcing labor law is the National Labor Relations Board 
(also known as the Labor Board or NLRB). An employer or a union 
that wants to enforce its rights under the Labor Act must go to the 
Labor Board. The same is true for a worker (except in regard to the 
duty of fair representation.*) 
The Labor Board is composed of five members, who are experts in 
labor relations. They are appointed for five-year terms by the presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate. Decisions of the board 
can be appealed to the federal courts, which can enforce, or refuse to 
enforce, the orders of the board. 
GONCERTED ACTIVITY 
The heart of the Labor Act is its section 7. The central idea of sec-
tion 7 is that workers have the right to engage in collective bargain-
ing instead of individual bargaining. Congress recognized this right 
because workers as individuals have little bargaining power when 
they deal with employers, particularly large corporations. The result 
of this lack of power is that workers can be forced to accept low wages 
and poor working conditions. But if workers can band together and, 
as a group, usually through a union, negotiate with their employer, 
they have a better chance to achieve a living wage and decent working 
conditions. 
To reach these goals, section 7 guarantees employees the right to 
engage in "concerted activity," which means the right to act together to 
improve their working lives. By definition, one worker cannot engage 
in concerted activity. It requires two or more workers acting jointly. 
Congress recognized that some workers prefer not to engage in 
concerted activity. Therefore, section 7 also guarantees employees the 
right to refrain from assisting and joining unions. 
* The duty of fair representation is discussed in chapter 2. 
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THE MEANING OF "ORGANIZED" 
The term "organized" refers to representation by a union. An organ-
ized worker is one whose wages and working conditions are deter-
mined by collective bargaining, and an organized shop is one in which 
the workers are represented by a union. An unorganized worker is one 
whose wages and working conditions are determined by individual 
bargaining, and an unorganized shop is one in which the workers and 
the employer engage in individual bargaining. 
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
An "unfair labor practice" is an action that the Labor Act forbids. It is 
an unfair labor practice for an employer or a union to interfere with 
concerted activity or to discriminate against a worker who is engaged 
in, or refraining from, concerted activity. For example, it would be an 
unfair labor practice for Harry's employer to punish him for trying to 
persuade Mary to support the union, and it would be an unfair labor 
practice for a union to refuse to process the grievance of a worker who 
chose not to join the union. 
A word about responsibility for unfair labor practices is in order. 
An "agent" is someone who acts on behalf of someone else. Employers 
and unions are responsible for the actions of their agents. This rule 
holds whether or not the employer or union is aware of the agent's 
illegal conduct; the rule holds even if the employer or union has a pol-
icy prohibiting the illegal conduct. Thus, if a foreman fires a worker 
because she favors the union, the employer cannot escape responsi-
bility by arguing that he did not know what the foreman was doing; 
the company has committed an unfair labor practice. If a business 
agent of a union threatens to pulverize a worker if he does not join 
at once, the union cannot escape responsibility by arguing that the 
union has a policy against intimidation; the union has committed an 
unfair labor practice. 
Only employers and unions (and their agents) can commit unfair 
labor practices. To say the same thing, the Labor Act regulates only 
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the actions of employers and unions. Thus, if Harry, acting on his 
own and without the knowledge of his union, threatens to ha rm Mary 
unless she joins the union, he has not committed an unfair labor 
practice. (He may have broken other laws, however.) 
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNITS 
The goal of labor law is stability in labor relations (as opposed to 
industrial warfare) and collective bargaining is the means to this 
goal. Put simply, bargaining aims to reconcile the competing inter-
ests of the employer and the union. But the process is not simple at 
all. The interests on each side of the bargaining table are complex; 
each side has objectives that conflict with one another. For example, 
the employer desires highly qualified workers, but also desires to pay 
low wages; the union represents some workers who need high take-
home pay, and other workers who prefer generous medical insurance 
or pension benefits. We can rely on the employer to harmonize its 
internal conflicts. A business is an authoritarian organization whose 
managers can order their subordinates to pursue a particular bar-
gaining strategy. For example, the shop foreman might say, "This firm 
needs excellent workers, so we should pay twenty dollars an hour." 
The accountant says, "We can't afford to pay more than twelve dollars 
an hour." The chief executive officer says, "I hear you both. Our limit 
will be fifteen," and fifteen becomes the firm's best offer to the union. 
A union is different. It is a democratic organization whose leaders 
must satisfy the workers it represents. Those workers may be unwill-
ing to compromise and, unlike a business, a union cannot order the 
workers to agree. Thus, collective bargaining has the potential to be 
chaotic if a union cannot harmonize its internal conflicts. 
The less internal conflict on the union's side of the bargaining table, 
the better the chances that collective bargaining will succeed. Labor 
law assumes that the interests of workers are determined, to a signifi-
cant extent, by their jobs. For example, workers whose jobs require 
heavy physical labor may want several rest breaks even if the work day 
is lengthened, whereas clerical workers in an office may need fewer 
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breaks and prefer a shorter work day. It follows that the more similar 
the jobs of workers whom a union represents, the less the internal 
conflict on the union's side of the table and, therefore, the better the 
chance that collective bargaining will succeed. 
As a result, labor law attempts to group similar jobs together 
for collective bargaining. A group of similar jobs is called an "appropri-
ate bargaining unit." Although workers will always find ways to disa-
gree, the workers who hold the jobs in an appropriate bargaining unit 
have similar issues about their work and should be able to settle on 
common goals. In consequence, employers need only bargain with 
unions that represent the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit. 
1 
LABOR LAW BEFORE 
THE LABOR ACT 
Employers took their labor troubles to court almost as soon as 
America became independent. We are a nation of many states; 
each state has its own courts, and they have often disagreed with 
one another about labor cases. As a result, accurate generalizations 
about labor law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are 
hard to make. Nevertheless, most students of early labor law would 
probably agree that the courts in those days were unsympathetic 
to unions. Whenever unions devised an effective new tactic .against 
employers (for example, strikes; later, boycotts), the courts responded 
to employers' complaints with new laws to control labor. 
Because the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects 
the freedom of association, the courts did not outlaw unions as such; 
but the courts did outlaw the tactics used by unions to improve their 
members' wages and working conditions. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a common union tactic was for union members 
to agree among themselves how much in wages they would accept 
from their employers; the members also refused to work in the same 
shop as any other worker who accepted less than union scale. But 
the courts held that this tactic was a criminal conspiracy, and juries 
composed of shopkeepers and landowners convicted and fined union 
members for striking over wages. 
10 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, prosecutions for criminal 
conspiracy had become ineffective in controlling labor unions. Several 
reasons explain this change. First, a criminal case was too slow. The 
workers could not be punished until after an indictment was issued 
and the case had gone to trial. This process often took several months, 
during which the strike or boycott was damaging the employer's busi-
ness. Second, as the right to vote, which was once limited to property 
holders, was extended to all men (women were denied the right to 
vote until 1920), juries were increasingly made up of workers, not 
merely shopkeepers and landowners; and workers were hesitant to 
find coworkers guilty of the crime of peacefully trying to improve 
their wages and working conditions. Third, the law was changing so 
that in many places a strike was not considered an illegal conspiracy. 
Employers, therefore, took their complaints to the civil courts, and 
here they found the perfect weapon for fighting unions: the injunc-
tion. An injunction is an order from a court requiring a person to do 
or not to do specific acts. A person can be sent to jail for violating an 
injunction. Injunctions are fast: one can be issued the very day it is 
requested. And injunctions are issued by judges, not juries. In the past, 
the law permitted judges to issue injunctions against unions freely. 
For example, the law authorizes an injunction to control violence and 
intimidation. Courts held that picket lines were "moral intimidation" 
and issued injunctions against picketing, even though the picketers 
merely walked back and forth and tried to persuade workers and cus-
tomers to go elsewhere. 
ROLE OF ANTITRUST LAW 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in order to 
control monopolies in business, but the wording of the law was so 
general that it could be applied to labor unions as well. The stat-
ute outlawed "every...combination...or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states." Although this act was 
not used against strikes over wages and hours, it was used to control 
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union organizing. In the infamous Daribury Hatters case, the union 
sought to organize all the fur-hat makers of America by boycotting 
the products of nonunion manufacturers. One manufacturer sued, 
arguing that the boycott was a restraint of trade. The courts found 
that the boycott did diminish trade among the states and awarded 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages—payable by the indi-
vidual workers! (The American Federation of Labor later raised the 
funds necessary to settle the case.) 
Twenty-five years later, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton 
Act, which stated, "the labor of a human being is not a commod-
ity or article of commerce" and "no...injunction shall be granted 
in any case between an employer and employees...growing out of a 
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." Union lead-
ers regarded the Clayton Act as a great victory for organized labor; 
Samuel Gompers, the first president of the American Federation of 
Labor, called the Clayton Act "the Magna Carta of labor." But the 
courts turned the victory into defeat by holding that Congress did not 
mean to permit boycotts in support of organizing campaigns. Once 
again, employers, with willing aid from the courts, found a way to 
restrict the power of workers. 
NORRIS-LAGUARDIAACT 
The modern law of labor relations begins with the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932, which is still in force today. With some exceptions, this 
statute restricts the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in 
cases growing out of labor disputes. One reason for this statute was 
that federal judges had created so much unfavorable law and issued 
so many crippling injunctions that the federal judiciary became, in 
the eyes of labor, the symbol as well as the instrument of antiunion-
ism. Another, perhaps more important reason for the statute was the 
Great Depression. Unemployment reached 25 percent or more, and 
today's social insurance programs (such as unemployment insur-
ance and welfare) did not exist then. As a result, workers and their 
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families suffered terribly. Organized labor spoke on their behalf. The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act was a step toward recognizing unions as the 
legitimate representatives of workers. 
But Norris-LaGuardia was a small step, and it applied only to 
the federal courts. State courts were still free to issue injunctions 
in labor disputes (though some states later passed "little Norris-
LaGuardia acts"). Also, both federal and state courts remained free 
to hold unions liable in civil law suits, for example, for violation of 
antitrust laws. Perhaps most important, employers remained free to 
discharge workers who led, joined, or as much as sympathized with 
unions; and employers had no duty to bargain with unions, even if 
they represented a majority of workers. Further steps were necessary 
to empower labor unions. 
2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LABOR ACT 
In 1935, Congress recognized unions as legitimate representatives 
of workers. The National Labor Relations Act (sometimes called the 
Wagner Act) required private employers to deal with unions and pro-
hibited discrimination against union members. (Public employers, 
that is, federal, state, and local governments, are not covered by the 
Labor Act.) Employers who violated the Wagner Act could be tried 
before the National Labor Relations Board, which had the power to 
order them to stop the illegal behavior and compensate the victims 
for lost pay. As a check on the power of the Labor Board, the law 
provided that appeals from the board's decisions could be taken to 
the federal appellate courts. The courts were instructed to respect the 
board's special expertise in labor affairs. 
By 1947, unions had grown in power, and public opinion toward 
them turned hostile. Perhaps the greatest cause of this hostility was 
the wave of strikes after the Second World War. During the war, 
strikes were prohibited, and wages were controlled. Afterward, many 
unions struck to make up for what they had lost during the war. There 
was also a steep rise in inflation, which the public blamed on unions. 
In addition, management organized itself to fight the growing power 
of unions. The result was the Labor Management Relations Act (often 
called the Taft-Hartley Act). Its most important feature was that it 
outlawed certain practices by unions. Starting in 1947, the Labor 
14 
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Board and the courts had the power to order unions to stop unfair 
labor practices and to compensate the victims of that behavior. 
Taft-Hartiey was amended by the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act) and by the 
Health Care Amendments of 1974, but the basic structure of the law 
was not changed. In this book, the term "Labor Act" refers to labor 
law as it stands today. 
COVERAGE OF THE LABOR ACT 
Protected and Unprotected Workers 
Most workers who hold (or are seeking) jobs in private firms are pro-
tected by the Labor Act. "Protected" means that the law shields these 
workers against unfair labor practices and guarantees them the right 
to engage in collective bargaining with their employers. 
But not all workers are protected by the Labor Act. The Act protects 
only workers who fall within its definition of "employee." Workers 
who fall outside of this definition have no legal right to engage in 
collective bargaining, may not vote in union representation elections, 
and are not protected by the law against unfair labor practices. The 
following classes of workers are not protected: 
• employees of federal, state, or local governments 
• employees of railroads or airlines 
• agricultural workers 
• domestic servants working in their employers' homes 
• spouses and children of employers 
• independent contractors 
• American citizens working for American-owned firms in foreign 
countries 
• managers and supervisors. 
In some cases, employees who are not protected by the Labor Act 
are protected by other laws. For example, the Railway Labor Act cov-
ers employees of railroads and airlines; a few states have laws that 
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apply to agricultural employees; and the majority of states and the 
federal government protect governmental employees. Of course, such 
laws may differ from the Labor Act; therefore, the rules discussed in 
this book may not apply to those workers. 
Also, some classes of workers, for example, construction workers, 
health care workers, and guards, are covered by the Labor Act, but 
special rules apply to them. This book does not include these spe-
cial rules. 
Many issues have arisen concerning who is covered by the Labor 
Act. Let us consider a few of them. 
Supervisors. Supervisors are not "employees" under the Labor Act. 
They are not protected against unfair labor practices, and they have 
no right to engage in collective bargaining. What makes a worker a 
supervisor? The statute specifies that a worker is a supervisor if she 
has the authority, and uses independent judgment (as opposed to fol-
lowing someone else's orders), to do any of the following to another 
employee: 
* hire 
* transfer 
* suspend 
* layoff 
* recall 
* promote 
* discharge 
* assign 
* reward 
* discipline 
* responsibly direct 
* adjust grievances 
* effectively recommend any of the above. 
If a worker performs even one of these functions, she is considered a 
supervisor. 
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Professionals. The Labor Act explicitly protects professional 
workers, such as engineers and nurses. Professionals, however, usu-
ally perform at least one supervisory function, for example, assigning 
work to another employee. As a result, many professionals must be 
classified as supervisors, and so they are not protected against unfair 
labor practices and have no right to engage in collective bargaining. 
Graduate students. Most universities use some graduate students 
as research assistants to professors and as teaching assistants in under-
graduate courses. Graduate assistants are paid wages (or their tuition 
is waived, or both) and usually receive benefits such as medical insur-
ance. These students, therefore, play two roles. The Labor Act does 
not protect them in their role as students; the Act applies to employ-
ment relations, not to teacher-student relations. Does the Act protect 
them in their role as research and teaching assistants? This role, if 
played by nonstudents, would surely count as employment. That is, if 
the university secured the services of nonstudents to assist professors 
in research and teaching, the nonstudents would unquestionably have 
the right to bargain collectively over the terms of their employment. 
As unions have sought to organize graduate assistants, universi-
ties have resisted. The parties cannot agree on the issue. Universi-
ties assert the issue is, which role predominates? Are the assistants 
primarily students or employees? Unions assert that the issue is, can 
the two roles be separated? Can unions bargain with universities over 
assistants' employment issues (for example, wages) but not over edu-
cational issues (for example, curriculum)? The Labor Board seems 
unable to make up its mind. Sometimes it asks which role predomi-
nates, and then holds that graduate assistants are primarily students 
who have no right to bargain with their universities. Other times it 
asks whether the roles can be separated, and then authorizes bargain-
ing over employment issues. 
Other persons who play two roles are in the same boat as gradu-
ate students. For example, medical interns and residents may desire 
to bargain with their hospitals, and disabled workers may wish to 
bargain with sheltered workshops. Whether they are protected by the 
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Labor Act seems to vary with the political party of the majority of the 
members of the Labor Board. 
Undocumented workers. The status of undocumented workers is 
ambiguous. The Labor Board and courts have held that an undoc-
umented worker is an "employee" under the Labor Act and has the 
same rights and protections as other employees. For example, an un-
documented worker may vote in a representation election; a union 
must represent an undocumented worker fairly and in good faith, 
and an employer may not discriminate against an undocumented 
worker because of the worker's support for a union. At the same time, 
the Supreme Court has held that an undocumented worker who is the 
victim of an unfair labor practice, for example, is discharged for sup-
porting a union, is ineligible for the usual remedies of reinstatement 
and back pay. The Court's reasons were that an employer cannot le-
gally rehire an undocumented worker, and these remedies would en-
courage and condone violations of federal immigration law. 
Salts. When a union seeks to organize a shop, sometimes union 
members (they may be organizers paid by the union, or simply workers 
in the trade) apply for jobs in the shop in order to have easy access to 
the employees and to vote for the union in an election. This practice is 
called salting, and the union members are called salts. Suppose an em-
ployer detects that an applicant is a salt and refuses to hire that person. 
Has the employer committed the unfair labor practice of discriminat-
ing against an employee because of the employee's concerted activity? 
The answer depends on whether a salt is an "employee" as defined 
in the Labor Act. Employers argued that a salt who is a paid organizer 
is an employee of the union, not of the company. Unions argued that 
a worker may be an employee of two different employers at the same 
time, for example, a worker who holds a day job in one firm and an 
evening job in another firm. Employers responded that a salt, whether 
paid by the union or not, takes orders from, and is loyal to, the union, 
not the company. Unions replied that a salt has to follow the compa-
ny's orders during working hours like any other worker. The Supreme 
Court settled the issue by ruling that a salt is an employee. Therefore, 
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it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to hire 
or to discharge someone suspected of being a salt. 
Recently, however, the Labor Board has raised a second question: Is 
the salt "genuinely interested" in holding the job? The board's reason-
ing is that a salt often resigns after a shop is organized and, therefore, 
has little in common with employees who want to keep their jobs. 
Accordingly, the board's new rule is that a salt is not protected by the 
Labor Act (and an employer is legally free to discriminate against 
the salt) unless it can be proved that the salt intended to keep the job. 
The courts have not yet reviewed this rule. If they approve it, salting 
will become less effective. 
Strikers. What happens if an employee who is protected by the La-
bor Act goes on strike? If employees refuse to work, it can be argued 
that they have resigned their jobs and are no longer employees of the 
struck employer. The Act, however, specifically provides that strikers 
remain employees, so strikers continue to enjoy the protection of the 
Act. But strikers lose their status as employees of the struck employer 
if they abandon the strike and take permanent jobs in other firms."' 
SECTION 7: PROTECTION FOR CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
We mentioned in the introduction that section 7 of the Labor Act 
protects workers as they engage in concerted activity, and we defined 
"concerted activity" to mean workers acting together or "in concert" 
to improve their wages and working conditions. Here we will discuss 
some of the issues that arise pertaining to concerted activity. 
Organized Workers 
The protection of concerted activity in section 7 applies to organized 
workers on the job. In one case, an employer called a worker into the 
* The rights of strikers are discussed in chapters 4 and 6. 
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office and accused her of stealing. She asked to have her shop steward 
present during the rest of the interview; the employer refused. The 
Supreme Court held that a worker who reasonably believes an inter-
view will lead to discipline, and who asks for union representation, 
has a right to have a union representative present during the inter-
view. (The Court also held that the employer may choose to cancel 
the interview and investigate the matter without hearing from the 
worker, rather than let the union representative attend the interview.) 
The Labor Board has ruled that a worker has no right to have a union 
steward present if the purpose of the interview is merely to inform 
the worker of discipline that the employer has already decided upon. 
Labor relations and politics often overlap. Consider, for example, 
a bill in a state legislature to increase the minimum wage, or a hear-
ing before a committee of Congress on undocumented workers. Is a 
worker who attends a rally or who circulates a newsletter about these 
issues engaged in concerted activity? The answer for the newsletter 
is clear from a case in which a union wrote a flyer that contained 
four sections. Two sections pertained to union solidarity; the third 
section encouraged workers to write their legislators and oppose a 
right-to-work law, and the fourth section criticized the president for 
vetoing a bill to increase the minimum wage. The union asked the 
employer for permission to distribute the flyer on company property 
during nonworking hours; the employer denied permission, and the 
union filed a charge with the Labor Board. The Supreme Court held 
that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. The Court 
reasoned that the right to act in concert to improve the terms and 
conditions of employment includes acting through channels outside 
of the employer-employee relationship, including political channels. 
Does the same result apply to workers who, on their own time, 
attend a political rally that pertains to issues related to employment? 
The Labor Board and courts have not ruled on this question, but the 
answer will probably be yes. Businesses use the political process to 
advance their interests, and workers should also be free to do the same 
without fear of losing their jobs. 
A question that is still unresolved is whether section 7 protects 
sympathy strikers, for example, workers who refuse to cross a picket 
line at another employer's place of business. Some courts hold that 
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sympathy strikers are not engaged in concerted activity because they 
have nothing in common with the workers of the other employer; 
therefore, their employer may fire the sympathy strikers. Other courts 
hold that workers are entitled to make common cause with any other 
workers; therefore, sympathy strikers may not be fired because hon-
oring a picket line is like going on strike. But even these latter courts 
limit the workers' protection in two ways. First, workers who refuse 
to cross a picket line have the same status as the picketers. Thus, if the 
picketers are on an illegal strike, a worker who honored the picket 
line could be fired. If the picketers are on a lawful economic strike, a 
worker who honored the picket line could be permanently replaced."" 
Second, if sympathy strikers are covered by a labor contract that spe-
cifically gives up the right of workers to engage in a sympathy strike, 
the employer may fire them for violating the contract. What if the 
contract generally gives up the right to strike, but does not specifically 
mention sympathy strikes? Many contracts contain broad no-strike 
clauses (in which the union promises not to strike during the term 
of the contract for any reason) but do not specifically refer to sym-
pathy strikes. A conservative Labor Board created a presumption that 
broad no-strike clauses prohibit sympathy strikes; that is, sympathy 
strikes are illegal unless other evidence shows the parties specifically 
intended to permit them. A liberal board reversed that presumption, 
holding that broad no-strike clauses allow sympathy strikes unless the 
evidence shows the parties specifically intended to prohibit them. 
Section 7 also guarantees the right of employees to engage in col-
lective bargaining through the union of their choice. This right would 
be violated, for example, if an employer or a union tried to force 
workers to support union A instead of union B. 
Unorganized Workers 
So far, the examples of concerted activity have pertained to organ-
ized workers, but the right to concerted activity applies equally to 
unorganized workers. This point is obvious when one realizes that 
* The rights of economic strikers and the difference between being fired and being 
permanently replaced are discussed in chapter 4. 
22 CHAPTER 2 
workers who are attempting to organize themselves into a union, or 
are just thinking about it, may need legal protection more than any-
one else. Also, the right to refrain from concerted activity applies pri-
marily to unorganized workers. Accordingly, the right to engage in, or 
refrain from, concerted activity is not limited to union members or 
employees in organized shops. 
Unorganized workers have the right 4:o strike. The leading case 
began on a cold day in Baltimore. The furnace in a plant would not 
start, and several workers walked out together in protest, for which 
their employer discharged them. The Supreme Court held that the 
discharges were illegal. The key point was that the workers were acting 
in concert in relation to the conditions of their employment. 
Concerted activity need not be as dramatic as a strike. Presenting 
grievances to an employer can also be concerted activity. Thus, an 
employer committed an unfair labor practice by discharging unor-
ganized workers because they complained together about their work-
ing conditions. Indeed, ordinary grousing can be concerted activity. 
Suppose, for example, a few unorganized workers express to one 
another their dissatisfaction with the behavior of a supervisor. Or 
suppose one worker posts on her Facebook page a complaint about 
her supervisor and invites her coworkers to comment, and they do. 
These workers are engaged in concerted activity. 
The right of concerted activity protects any workers who are acting 
in concert to improve their working lives. Sometimes, what appears 
to be an individual act is concerted activity. For example, if Harry 
tries to persuade Mary to support a union, Harry is engaged in con-
certed activity (regardless of whether Mary is interested). Similarly, 
if Harry and Mary agree that their wages are too low, and, with her 
approval, Harry complains to their employer on behalf of himself and 
Mary, Harry is engaged in concerted activity. But if Harry goes to his 
employer alone and complains about only his own wages, he is not 
engaged in concerted activity. 
Many employers have confidentiality policies that prohibit employ-
ees from revealing their salaries to one another or discussing their 
performance evaluations, discipline, and the like. Such policies are 
illegal when applied to employees protected by the Labor Act. Talking 
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to coworkers about the conditions of employment is the heart of 
concerted activity. (In contrast, confidentiality policies that apply to 
business matters, such as company documents and trade secrets, are 
lawful.) 
Some employers have "nonfraternization" policies that restrict 
workers' off-duty behavior, for example, a rule against dating co-
workers. Such policies are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A hotel 
has a strong interest in preserving the professional status of its employ-
ees and in maintaining professional relationships between employees 
and guests; for this reason, a hotel's nonfraternization policy on the 
premises of the hotel is permissible. But a nonfraternization policy 
would be unlawful if employees could reasonably believe that it pre-
vents them from engaging in concerted activity, such as discussing 
their wages and conditions of employment at appropriate times and 
places. 
Recently, mandatory arbitration policies have become common 
in unorganized firms. These policies apply to rights created by stat-
utes, such as the right to be free from discrimination based on race, 
sex, age, or disability. For decades, when a worker believed that the 
employer had violated a worker's statutory right, the worker could 
take the case to trial in a court of law. Under a mandatory arbitration 
policy, however, in order to get a job a worker must agree to a trial 
before a private arbitrator. The courts have approved of these policies 
regarding the antidiscrimination statutes. Nonetheless, such a policy 
may not prevent the worker from filing a charge with an agency such 
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Curiously, 
then, a worker who signs a mandatory arbitration policy may file a 
charge of discrimination with the commission, but the trial of the 
case would be held before a'private arbitrator.) 
Do the same rules apply to the Labor Act? It seems certain that 
a mandatory arbitration policy may not prohibit a worker from fil-
ing an unfair labor practice charge with the Labor Board. But where 
would the trial of such a charge take place, before the Labor Board 
or before a private arbitrator? This question has not been answered 
yet. It is settled that a union may agree in a collective bargaining 
agreement that it will submit unfair labor practice cases to private 
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arbitration instead of the Labor Board. A union may also agree that 
workers will submit their claims of discrimination based on race, sex, 
age, or disability to private arbitration instead of the courts. Whether 
these precedents will be followed in the case of unfair labor practice 
charges by unorganized workers is anyone's guess. 
Let us consider one further example of concerted activity by unor-
ganized workers. We mentioned above that an organized worker has 
the right to request the presence of a union representative at an inter-
view that might lead to discipline. Suppose an unorganized employee, 
that is, an employee in a nonunion shop, asks for the presence of 
another employee at such an interview. The right to engage in con-
certed activity is not limited to organized shops, and one employee's 
helping another employee would seem to be a concerted act; yet 
organized and unorganized shops differ in many ways. The Labor 
Board has changed course on this issue more than once, and the 
results have followed partisan lines. When Democrats controlled the 
board, it ruled that an unorganized employee has a right to the pres-
ence of another employee at the interview. When Republicans took 
control of the board, it reversed itself and held that an unrepresented 
employee has no such right. When Democrats came back into power, 
the board reversed the reversal; and when Republicans returned to 
power, they reversed the reversal of the reversal. When the answer to 
a question of law depends on the political party in power, the legiti-
macy of an agency such as the Labor Board may be undermined. 
The Limits of Goncerted Activity 
Even workers who are acting together to improve their wages and 
working conditions can get themselves in trouble if they go too far. 
Let us consider two examples. 
Employees leave work early without permission in order to attend 
a union meeting. Attending a union meeting is concerted activity; but 
leaving work without permission is not protected, and the employer 
could legally discipline these workers. 
A union is on strike over wages, and Mary is walking the picket line 
in front of the shop. When a customer tries to enter the shop, Mary 
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blocks the door. When her supervisor warns her, she speaks disre-
spectfully to him. When a delivery truck pulls up, she puts tacks under 
the tires. Although striking is concerted activity, and the employer 
may not punish Mary for it, blocking the door, disrespecting a super-
visor, and damaging property are misconduct that is not protected by 
the Labor Act. The employer is free to punish Mary for such behavior. 
EXCLUSIVITY OF REPRESENTATION 
The majority of workers in an appropriate bargaining unit decide 
whether or not all the workers in that unit will be represented by 
a union. If a majority of workers in a bargaining unit choose to be 
represented by a union, the employer must bargain with the union 
regarding all the workers, even those who would prefer to bargain 
individually with their employer. The union becomes the exclusive 
bargaining agent of the unit; the employer must bargain with this 
union and none other. But if the majority chooses not to be repre-
sented by a union, the employer need not bargain with the union, 
even though many workers might be members of it. 
It is important to realize that representation by a union is separate 
from membership in a union. Membership is controlled by the union's 
own rules; the Labor Act says nothing about who may join a union. 
This fact affects representation in two ways that are illustrated by the 
following cases. First, Harry is the only person in his shop who is 
interested in joining a union. The union is free to accept Harry as a 
member. However, if the union tries to bargain on his behalf with his 
employer, for example, by trying to get a raise for Harry, the employer 
may ignore the union because it does not represent a majority of 
workers in the shop. Second, Mary wants to be a member of union 
A, but a majority of workers in the shop want to be represented by 
union B. Mary is free to join union A, and it is free to accept her. How-
ever, the employer must bargain with union B regarding all workers, 
including Mary, because a majority has chosen union B. (Union secu-
rity is discussed later in this chapter. Here it should be noted that, if 
the employer and the union agree to a union shop or an agency shop, 
